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Introduction 
The Brazilian transportation system ñas around l.b million km of 
roads, with only 14% of them being paved. Road transport is by far 
the most common mode of transportation in Brazil. In 2012, the 
road share was 61% for freight and 42% for interurban passenger 
transport [Confederacao Nacional do Transporte (CNT) 2012]. 
Road networks in Brazil are managed at different governmental 
levels, according to their functional roles. Networks whose main 
role is to connect different states (interstate networks) are owned 
and managed by the federal government, whereas roads that are 
mostly, or entirely, within a single state, are owned and managed 
by that state. 
In the 1980s, there was a reduction in the pace of road invest-
ment in Brazil because of budgetary constraints. The approval of 
a new constitution in 1988 was a crucial step leading to the imple-
mentation of road concession programs, which appeared as a sol-
ution to increase investment. With the aim of enhancing Brazilian 
competitiveness and boosting economic growth by promoting mar-
ket integration among different regions, the federal government 
launched its first interstate Road Concession Program in 1995 to 
upgrade, maintain, and operate five brownfield stretches of road, 
totaling 854.5 kilometers. The contracts were based on the reha-
bilitate, operate, and transfer (ROT) model. Years later, some states, 
including Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Rio Grande de Sul, 
also started their own road concession programs, with different 
approaches. 
Different public private partnership (PPP) arrangements have 
been implemented around the world to build/upgrade, maintain, 
operate, and finance new or existing roads. All these models were 
based on different types of agreements that can be classified in 
many ways. Among those ways would be to classify according to 
where the revenue comes from: that is, either from users, through 
tolls, or from budgetary resources of the government. In toll-
road PPP models, usually called concessions, most revenues come 
from explicit tolls directly collected by private developers from 
users. Consequently, the pricing approach is bundled into the 
contract. User payments should be enough to generate sufficient 
cash flow for paying back the expenditures and the financial cost 
of the project. 
By 2012, the Brazilian economy had changed from one of low 
and volatile growth to one of moderate and relatively stable growth 
because of lower interest rates that encouraged significant private 
and public investments. Among the beneficiaries of this growth and 
relative stability was the concession road system. As of 2012, in 
Brazil—accounting for federal, state and municipal roads—there 
were a total of 55 road concession contracts, involving 15,381 km 
of paved roads, representing around 7% of the total paved roads in 
the country. 
Through a review of the literature, several studies and research 
papers dealing with Brazilian road concessions have been identi-
fied. Rosa et al. (2010) reviewed the Brazilian concession program 
launched by federal and state governments. Barbo et al. (2010) 
explained the evolution of the regulations in road concessions and 
the changes implemented in the contract models at each stage of 
the concession program. Véron and Cellier (2010) published their 
research dealing with financial aspects of the road concession pro-
grams in Brazil. They conducted a comparison of costs and toll 
rates for each stage of the road concession program of the federal 
government. The Institute for Applied Economic Research in 
Brazil (IPEA) (2011, 2012) has published its calculations as to the 
public and private investment in roads per kilometer from 2003 
to 2011, has calculated the average toll rate for each concession 
program now in existence in Brazil, and further, has proposed an 
investment plan for the next 15 years. 
From the review of the literature, it appears that most of the stud-
ies and research on road concessions in Brazil conducted up to now 
have been either mostly practical in their focus or have limited their 
attention to this or that specific aspect of the program. The authors 
have not identified any published analysis that offers a thorough 
evaluation of the performance of the program as a whole. This is 
the need that this paper is intended to meet. 
This paper focuses on the road concession programs launched 
by the federal government of Brazil from 1995 to 2012. The authors 
did not analyze in detail the concession programs promoted by 
the individual states of Brazil because data from these programs 
are both scarce and, where available, hard to compare because the 
concession programs are not sufficiently homogeneous in their 
approaches. Although data from the states are rather dispersed, dif-
ficult of access, and not systematically organized, data from federal 
concessions are regularly and systematically published in the an-
nual reports of the National Agency for Land Transport (ANTT). 
The aim of this paper is to conduct an analysis of the per-
formance of the concession program launched by the federal 
government of Brazil from three different perspectives: the out-
come of the auctions, the revision of tolls, and the real traffic flows 
as compared with the original estimates. "Performance" is defined 
as the adequate mlfiUment of the expected goals for society as a 
whole. This includes benefits for users (adequate maintenance, 
fluid traffic, low tolls), the government, taxpayers, private promot-
ers, and lenders. Concessions will be considered to perform well if 
they ultimately meet the social goals they were designed for. 
This research is original and relevant for several reasons. First, 
Brazil is the country with the longest toll road network under con-
cessions in the world (Carpintero et al. 2012). Second, the authors 
have not found in the literature any systematic and thorough 
research dealing with Brazilian road concessions, how they have 
functioned, and how they might function better. Third, the case of 
Brazil should be of interest for emerging countries intending to 
promote extensive programs of road building using the concession 
method. The methodology used is based on the case study analysis 
(Flyvbjerg 2011), because there is not enough data available to 
reach conclusive results on the basis of statistical analysis. 
The study is divided into three main sections. In the first one, the 
paper provides an overview of road concessions in Brazil. The sec-
ond section sets out the main features of federal road concessions: 
toll setting and economic regulation, tendering and contracting, risk 
allocation, and financial sources and their costs. Finally, in the third 
section, the paper offers an assessment of the program from a three-
fold point of view: competitiveness in the original tender, toll modi-
fication, and traffic behavior. 
Road Concessions in Brazil: An Overview 
Brief History 
Ihe first toll road concession program was launched by the federal 
government in 1995 as part of the National Privatization Program. 
Hie government aimed to increase investments and quality in roads 
without spending the public budget. 
By 2012, the federal government had granted total concessions 
to the private sector amounting to 4,774 km of roads. The federal 
government launched concession programs in three different stages 
(see Table 1). In the first stage, from 1995 to 1998, six concessions 
were granted totaling 1,482.4 km. These concessions now offer a 
tack record that is sufficiently extensive to permit evaluation of 
Table 1. Road Concession Program by the Federal Government 
Stage 
1 
2.1 
2.2 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
Beginning of the contract 
June 1995 to July 1998 
February 2008 to March 2008 
October 2009 
September 2013a 
April 2013 
September 2013a 
Number of 
concessions 
6 
7 
1 
2 
1 
7 
Length 
(km) 
1,482.4 
2,600.0 
680.6 
1,753.5 
475.9 
5,748.3 
Note: Elaborated by the authors with data taken from ANTT (2011). 
"Scheduled. 
their performance. The second stage, in 2008 and 2009, involved 
the granting of eight concessions amounting to a total of 3,280 km. 
During the third stage, which began in 2012 with what is referred to 
as substage 3.2, concession awarded cover 2,229.4 km of roads, 
with the contract signed in April 2013. The bids for stage 3.1 and 
3.3 are scheduled to take place on 2013. 
The concession program seems to be successful in attaining its 
objective: to improve maintenance and road conditions in Brazil. 
In 2012, 86% of the roads operated by concessionaires were in 
"very good" or "good" condition, considering aspects of pavement, 
signage, and design. In contrast, only 27% of the roads managed by 
the government had achieved the same classification (CNT 2012). 
In addition, the experience it obtained from the concession con-
tracts awarded in the first stage enabled the government to improve 
the concession process by restructuring government institutions 
and introducing changes in the road concession model. These 
changes both improved the contract design and streamlined the 
bidding process. 
Legal and Institutional Framework 
For the development of the first stage of the Federal Road Con-
cession Program, new legislation, the Concessions Law 8987/ 
1995, was passed. It defined the obligations and rights of users, 
concessionaires, and the government, and established the bidding 
procedure and the pricing policy for these contracts. This law was 
further complemented by two later acts of legislation: Law 9074/ 
1995, which laid out general rules applicable to granting conces-
sions to private parties for supplying public services, and Law 
9277/1996, which allowed local states in Brazil to set out for 
concessionary bids stretches of federal road within their complete 
jurisdiction. 
According to this legislation, road infrastructure concessions are 
defined as the transference of the management of a defined stretch 
of road to a private company for a period of time contractually 
agreed on in advance. During the contract term, concessionaires 
are committed to undertaking all the work necessary to ensure ad-
equate service to the users. The contract defines adequate service as 
that which meets the following conditions: regularity, continuity, 
efficiency, comfort, safety, fluid traffic flow, modernization, univer-
sality, courtesy toward the public, and reasonable tariffs. These 
conditions are monitored regularly by the government and, for 
some of them, there is a set of requirements imposed on the con-
cessionaire to ensure compliance with minimum standards as to 
the following: cleaning and maintenance of the pavement, signage, 
drainage system, safety and structural elements. Concessionaires 
are, in turn, entitled to charge tolls to the users to finance their 
required activities. At the end of the period, the asset—that is, the 
road—will revert to the government in perfect operating, and main-
tenance conditions, as defined according to the contract. 
Almost 10 years after the approval of the concessions law, anew 
law related to infrastructure management was passed: the Public 
Private Partnerships (PPP) law 11079/2004. This law is applicable 
to any kind of infrastructure, and, unlike the concessions law, it 
allows for subsidies to be given to private sponsors in charge of 
managing public infrastructure assets. This law substantially broad-
ened the possibility of transferring public assets to private sponsors, 
mainly those assets judged to be socially efficient and strategic for 
the country, but which were not financially feasible for private 
sponsors to assume responsibility for without public subsidies. 
It also enabled the government to implement social policies by 
setting up toll rates more affordable to everybody. In 2007 the states 
started to use this type of contract for roads. However, at the end 
of 2012, the federal government had not yet made use of it, 
basically because all the stretches of road awarded to private con-
cessionaires by the federal government at that time were profitable 
by themselves and no further inducement, through subsidies, was 
necessary. 
The public institution entrusted to manage and regulate federal 
road concession contracts at present is the Agencia Nacional de 
Transportes Terrestres (ANTT), or in English, the National Agency 
for Land Transport. This agency was created in 2001, five years 
after the first federal road concession was granted. The ANTT, 
which is in charge of regulating the land transport sector, including 
federal road concession, enjoys economic independence and the 
power to regulate concessions within its scope of competence. 
Specifically, it is in charge of tendering the concessions and also 
of monitoring and regulating the contracts, once awarded, during 
the term of the concession. 
The latest institutional change in the transport sector worth 
mentioning occurred in 2012. It was the creation of the Enterprise 
for Planning and Logistics (EPL). The EPL is responsible for 
providing planning services to the transport sector, engaging in 
relevant research, and obtaining environmental permits for trans-
portation projects. This change was prompted by the general belief 
that the existing institutional framework was not adequate and 
was the cause of the lack of progress, both in the development of 
concessions programs and in the implementation of public-private 
partnerships (Véron and Cellier 2010). This new institution aims to 
fill a gap in the areas of policy formulation, planning, and transport 
research in Brazil. 
Main Features of Federal Road Concessions 
Toll Setting and Economic Regulation of the Contract 
Tolls are charged at toll plazas, both manually (with human toll 
takers) and using machines that automatically record the toll. The 
road system is such that users going through a toll plaza are charged 
a fixed price irrespective of the distance they have already driven or 
will be driving subsequently. The low population density in Brazil 
makes it economically unfeasible to set up toll plazas at every ac-
cess point. Toll plazas are located on the main points of the roads, 
but these are ordinarily located far from urban areas to minimize the 
traffic backup in densely populated locales. Toll rates applicable to 
vehicles other than cars are calculated as a multiplier of the toll rate 
for cars. The multiplier is equal to the number of axles used. 
Toll rates are updated every year according to two different 
triggers: adjustment and revision. The adjustment index controls 
for the effect of inflation. The revision index affects directly the 
basic toll rate (BR), and it is applied to compensate the concession-
aire for risks that were not allocated to it in the contract, such as, for 
example, additional works that the government may subsequently 
require. 
The adjustment index used for the federal concessions belong-
ing to the first stage, contracts in the period from 1995 to 1998, was 
based on the weighted average of a basket of prices, replicating the 
main cost components for road works. The concession contracts 
belonging to the second stage, from the period 2008 to 2009, used 
a specific inflation rate, the consumer price index (CPI), which is 
known in Brazil as IPCA. In the third stage, from 2012 on, the 
contracts adopted the price cap regulation to incentivize efficiency 
and to share productivity gains made by the concessionaires with 
the users. The adjustment index is set on the basis of CPI-X, which 
uses the CPI less the efficiency factor, called the X-factor. The 
X-factor is zero at the beginning of the contract and increases 
0.25% at the end of every five-year period. 
Unlike the adjustment, the revision is a means to compensate the 
concessionaire for those risks that are not borne by them according 
to the contract terms. These risks are not set at the discretion of 
the ANTT. They include, for example, force majeure risks, such 
as natural disasters, modification of direct taxes, or work delays 
caused by problems in the public sector. These all constitute risks 
that the concessionaire should not be responsible for, as they are not 
a foreseeable and normal part of the business. The current practice 
is that contracts are to be revised on an annual basis. However, to 
reduce the frequency of the revisions, the ANTT passed a provision 
whereby contracts will be completely revised every five years. 
In addition, from 2009 on, there was an important change in the 
way that the economics of the contracts were to be rebalanced in 
cases where new works were added by the government to the con-
cessionaire's responsibilities. As the contract stipulates that the 
risk of additional works added by the government is not borne by 
the concessionaire, these additional works will result in toll rate 
revision. Before 2009, the costs of these new works were included 
in the cash flow of the original financial model by adopting the 
economic and financial conditions at the time of bidding. There-
fore, this situation could derive an extra profit or loss to the 
concessionaire if the conditions at the time of the revision were 
better or worse than at the time the financial model was produced. 
To minimize this when new works are asked of the concession-
aires by the government, after 2009 the government began to use 
a corrected (marginal) cash flow for the new works to rebalance 
the contract. This cash flow considers the economic scenario at the 
time of the revision using the real traffic flow to calculate the in-
comes, the market prices to estimate costs, the rate of return based 
on the long-term interest rate (TJLP) of the Development Bank of 
Brazil (BNDES), and the inflation rate. This modification aims to 
remunerate the concessionaire for the actual cost to the concession-
aire of the additional work, irrespective of the original conditions, 
as it is a new work added after the tender. For the third stage, from 
2012, the innovation in the contract was that the corrected cash flow 
now uses an internal rate of return based on the weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC). 
Tendering and Contracting 
Toll road concessions in Brazil are granted through a competitive 
tender process. Concession terms are fixed and defined in the con-
tracts, and in most of the cases they last for 25 years. The tender 
procedure followed during the first stage, in the period from 1995 
to 1998, has undergone some change in the subsequent stages. For 
the concessions granted in the first stage, the tender consisted of 
three phases: first, an open prequalification; second, a definition 
of the characteristics of the project conducted by the government 
along with the prequalified bidders; and third, a final auction on the 
toll rates. The bidder offering the lowest toll will end up winning 
the tender. In the first stage of the federal concession program, 
only engineering and construction companies were allowed to 
present offers, whereas financial institutions were not allowed to 
submit bids. 
The tender process used in the second and third stages, from 
2008 on, changed because legislation as to such tenders, for road 
concessions in Brazil, has been modified. Important changes were 
introduced. Before launching the tender, the government was 
now required to present a basic project, so the second phase of the 
tender—the defining of the characteristics of the project—was 
eliminated. Instead of that, the legislation introduced a new require-
ment: a series of public hearings about the technical and economic 
studies of the concession project even before beginning the auction. 
In addition to the elimination of the second phase of the tender, 
the first and third phases of the tender were, in essence, now re-
versed. From 2008 on, in the first phase the most competitive offer 
will be quickly identified. Once this offer has been so identified, the 
following phase of the tender will be devoted to checking whether 
the qualifying documents of the best bidder are all in order. If the 
best offer qualifies in this phase, it will be awarded the contract. 
If it does not, the government will continue the process with the 
second-best offer from the first phase of the tender. These changes 
resulted in faster auctions because they avoided the need for the 
government to evaluate the qualification documents of all the 
offers. Another change introduced in the second and third stages, 
compared with the first one, was to permit the participation of many 
other types of bidders, including financial institutions, pension 
funds, and investment funds, within the bidding consortia. 
Risk Allocation 
A study conducted by Ke et at. (2010) in four countries revealed 
that risks related to construction, design, finance, and operation are 
usually allocated to the private sector, whereas political risks are 
usually allocated to the public sector. The toll road concession 
approach implemented in Brazil transfers most of the key risks 
onto the private sponsors. Concessionaires bear traffic, finance, 
construction, maintenance, and operation risks. Expropriation risk 
is not that important because most of the concessions are brown-
field projects. 
Traffic risk, which is hardly manageable by any stakeholder, 
is bome completely by private concessionaries. This means that 
private sponsors will end up collecting windfall profits if traffic 
turns out to be higher than expected, but they might end up incur-
ring large losses if traffic is lower than expected. Unlike other 
Latin American countries such as Chile and Colombia, Brazil 
has never implemented traffic risk mitigation guarantees (Vassallo 
and Izquierdo 2010). In this respect, different case studies show 
different results. Vassallo (2006) found that mitigating traffic risk 
in Chile was very effective. However, Heravi and Hajihosseini 
(2012) report unsuccessful experiences with little or no demand 
risk on the private party, from a study of two toll road projects 
in Iran. 
Financial risks are also allocated to private sponsors in Brazil. 
Interest rates that are lower than expected will bring about sizeable 
windfall benefits to concessionaires, which will not be transferred 
to the users. This situation actually occurred in Brazil, where in-
terest rates decreased dramatically over the years, so the refinancing 
of the initial loans was quite favorable for the sponsors. 
The allocation of construction risk has evolved over time. The 
total cost of work may be calculated as quantity units x unit cost. 
This information is included in the financial proposal of the bidder. 
Despite what the bidding is for the lower toll rate, after the tender 
procedure all the documents submitted by the winning bidder 
become part of the contract, and they can be used to revise the toll 
rate during the concession period. Originally, the risk related to the 
price of materials—unit cost risk—was allocated to concession-
aires, whereas the risk of the amount of material used—quantity 
risk—was transferred to the users through the periodic revision of 
tolls. Consequently, a sharp variation in the price of a certain unit of 
work, such as material or labor force, which has to be borne by the 
concessionaire while using additional work units, that use amount 
of material or labor force different from the amounts calculated in 
the initial bid, will however ultimately be paid by users through 
higher revised tolls. This approach was shown not to be efficient, 
because concessionaires did not have an incentive to employ fewer 
resources and, as a consequence of that, the approach was modified 
in the second and third stages. 
The changes introduced in the second and third stages related to 
the approach for the allocation of construction risk were aimed at 
reducing the frequency of contract revisions and at incentivizing 
concessionaires to increase their productivity. From the second 
stage on, concessionaires had to bear the bulk of the construction 
risk, both as to quantity and unit cost. In addition, contracts entered 
into during the second and third stages distinguished between man-
datory and conditional works. Mandatory works have to be under-
taken by the concessionaire following a predefined schedule; for 
example, third lanes should be built during the fifth year of the 
concession period. Conditional works, however, have to be built by 
the concessionaire only if certain performance targets set up in the 
contract are eventually reached. Consequently, conditional works 
do not have a fixed date when they must be constructed. For in-
stance, the concessionaire may be required to build an additional 
lane only when traffic flows reach a certain volume, as determined 
by the terms of the contract. The concessionaire cannot be certain, 
nor can the government, when that traffic volume will be reached, 
if it ever is. 
Since 2008, maintenance and operation performance targets 
have been added to concession contracts belonging to the second 
and third stages. The performance targets selected for such inclu-
sion refer to pavement, road signage, maintenance, and cleaning 
of the road. From stage 2.2 onwards, a toll rate discount was trig-
gered if and when certain performance levels set out in the contract 
were not achieved. This discount is applicable to the toll rate if 
the service provided by the concessionaire to the user is below the 
service standards agreed on in the contract. 
Financial Sources and Their Costs 
In 1995, at the beginning of the first stage of the federal toll road 
concession program, Brazil was experiencing high inflation and 
high interest rates. Project internal rates of return (IRRs) required 
by private sponsors hardly ever fell below 18% per year. The finan-
cial costs were consequently very high. In 2012, Brazil still ranked 
among the countries with the highest nominal and real interest rates 
in the world. However, from 1995 to 2009, there was a gradual 
reduction in both nominal and real rates. The interest rate in Brazil 
that most influences monetary policy, an overnight rate called Selic, 
was around 25% per year in the late 1990s. However, only 10 years 
later, it had fallen to around 10% per year. Since 2005, this scenario 
has created positive expectations among economic actors, encour-
aging a new cycle of private investments directed at the moderni-
zation and expansion of production capacity. The decrease in the 
interest rate has caused a substantial reduction in the financial costs 
of such projects. The IRR of the projects awarded from 2008 to 
2012 was around 8.5% per year, much lower than it was at the 
first stage. 
According to Lacerda (2005), the sources of money to fund the 
initial works of a toll road project in Brazil are, on average, dis-
tributed as follows: 25% equity provided by the sponsors, 58% 
loans, and 17% cash generated by toll charges. The initial works 
include the rehabilitation of the road during the first five years of 
the concession period. As they are brownfield projects, concession-
aires can start charging toll rates after initial maintenance work and 
the construction of toll plazas, which usually take six months. From 
the distribution of sources, financial costs of requiring equity and 
debt are hence relevant for the project. Ultimately, loans and con-
tributions from sponsors will be repaid by users from toll sources. 
Because of the high interest rates in Brazil, concessionaires re-
lied very much on loans provided by the State Bank for Economic 
and Social Development (BNDES). This government-owned bank 
played a key rolein the long-term financing of concession projects. 
In contrast, private banks charged high interest rates and did not 
feel comfortable providing long-term loans in the unstable scenario 
that characterized Brazil's economy at the beginning of the first 
concession stage. 
For this reason, BNDES has been the main source of funding 
for investment in road concessions in Brazil, by reducing the finan-
cial costs of the projects through longer terms and subsidized rates. 
In 2010, BNDES supplied 64% of the total credit extended in 
the short- and medium-term and 100% of the long-term credit 
(Brochado and Vassallo 2012). Its liabilities come mostly from 
money allocated from the federal budget, or from the funds accu-
mulated by the unemployment insurance system. 
The BNDES credit line for the road sector has the following 
main characteristics (BNDES 2011): 
• It offers 10-year loans with long grace periods—the period of 
time that the lender allows the borrower to start paying back the 
principal of the loan—of up to 5 years; 
• It can finance up to 60% of the total capital cost; 
• It offers lower interest rates, based on the long-term interest rate 
(TJLP), which in 2012 was at 5% per year, whereras private 
banks use the interbank deposit certificate (CDI), which stood 
at 8.4% in 2012; 
• It offers loans which are denominated in the Brazilian currency, 
the same currency, that is, in which the tolls are paid and toll 
revenues calculated. 
Such a financing framework proved adequate to support the 
toll road concession program at its origins because of the tough 
financing conditions offered by the market at that time. According 
to Véron and Cellier (2010), with the expansion of the Brazilian 
capital markets and the more favorable financing conditions, the 
picture changed, and emerging concessionaire groups increasingly 
refinanced early loans, as well as subsequent acquisitions, on the 
basis of debentures. 
Assessment of the Performance of the Federal 
Concession Program 
This section evaluates the performance of the federal road con-
cession program using the data available as of 2012. This anal-
ysis focuses on three key aspects: the competition among bidders 
at the tender phase; the changes in the yearly toll calculation; and 
the changes in the amount of actual traffic, as compared with the 
forecasts at the time of the bidding. The analysis of all these as-
pects, along with the previous description of the program, provides 
enough information to obtain interesting results about the perfor-
mance of road concessions in Brazil. The data used were collected 
from the annual reports of the National Agency for Land Trans-
port (ANTT). 
Competitiveness in the Tender 
The main objective of tendering in contracts for public infrastruc-
ture with characteristics typical of natural monopolies is to promote 
competition among private operators for the right to construct and 
manage the infrastructure for a certain period of time. The tender 
will be more effective insofar as it is able to promote greater com-
petition and consequently result ultimately in lower tolls for the 
users. In this respect, a higher tariff discount would presumably 
mean a more effective tendering process. 
For the case study of the Federal Toll Road Concession 
Program, the authors analyzed the effect that the competitiveness 
in the tender—measured by examining the number of bidders 
per tender—has on the toll rate discount offered by the ultimate 
winning bidder. The maximum toll rate (MTR) is estimated by the 
government in the feasibility study of the project by using their own 
predictions regarding the costs of the works and traffic projections. 
At the time of bidding, the government makes available to the bid-
ders the feasibility study used to calculate the MTR. From this in-
formation, each bidder can calculate its own cash flow, considering 
its cost, traffic forecasts, and internal rates of returns. Therefore, the 
bidders have autonomy to construct their own cash flows on the 
basis of their own forecasts and works costs predictions. The level 
of discounts measures the efficiency that bidders expect to reach 
compared with the government benchmark. 
The last nine concessions awarded from 2007 to 2012 were con-
sidered, which belong to stages 2 and 3. Unfortunately, there are no 
data available from stage 1. To that end, by using data available in 
Bolsa de Valores de Sao Paulo (BOVESPA) (2012), which is the 
stock exchange where the auction took place, the toll rate discount 
ultimately offered by the winning bidder is calculated according to 
Eq. (1). This ratio appears to be a good proxy for measuring the 
level of competiveness in the tender: 
where D = toll rate discount in the tender (%); MTR - maximum 
toll rate established by the government (R$); and WTR = toll rate 
offered by the winning bidder (R$). 
The results of stages 2.1, 2.2, and 3.2 are displayed in Table 2. 
There were seven auctions within stage 2.1. They were attended 
by 29 groups, including domestic and foreign investors, with an 
average of 10 bidders per project. The auctions in this stage were 
extremely successful, reaching toll rate discounts of up to 65% of 
the maximum toll rate set up by the government. The next auction 
corresponded to stage 2.2. It took place in January 2009, a few 
months after the world financial crisis exploded. This fact prompted 
a substantial reduction of bidders, down to just two, even though 
the winner's toll rate also reflected a significant discount of 21%. 
The most recent auction was held in January 2012, after the eco-
nomic recovery. There were eight bidders, and the winner's toll rate 
had a discount of 45%. 
There is almost a perfect correlation between the number of 
bidders that ultimately attended the tender and the final discount 
achieved. Of course, the tolls offered by the winning bidder will 
depend on its traffic estimates, and the literature demonstrates that 
fierce competition in the tender encourages bidders to inflate their 
traffic forecasts (Baeza and Vassallo 2012). That, of course, might 
end up making renegotiations over the life of the contract more 
likely. 
This fact seems to show that the larger the number of bidders in 
the tender the greater the efficiency obtained for the users, at least at 
the beginning, through the lower toll levels that result from such 
Table 2. Results of the Auctions 
Concessionaire 
Stage 2.1 
Autopista Fernao Dias 
Autopista Fluminense 
Autopista Litoral Sul 
Autopista Planalto Sul 
Autopista Regis Bittencourt 
Rodovia do Acó 
Transbrasiliana 
Stage 2.2 
Rodobahia 
Stage 3.2 
BR-101 ES/BA 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
Length (km) 
562.1 
320.1 
382.3 
412.7 
401.6 
200.4 
321.6 
680.6 
475.9 
— 
— 
Auction date 
09/10/07 
09/10/07 
09/10/07 
09/10/07 
09/10/07 
09/10/07 
09/10/07 
01/21/09 
01/18/12 
— 
— 
Number of bidders 
15 
8 
17 
10 
13 
3 
10 
2 
8 
9.56 
5.03 
Toll rate (R$/100 km) 
1.56a 
3.90a 
1.43a 
3.27a 
2.24a 
4.79a 
3.23a 
1.99b 
3.39c 
^~ 
— 
Discount (%) 
65.42 
40.95 
62.67 
39.35 
49.19 
27.17 
39.99 
21.00 
45.63 
43.49 
14.55 
Note: Elaborated by the authors with data taken from Bovespa (2012); database: Federal road concessions from 2007. 
database: July 2007, exchange rate: RS1.88/US$. 
bDatabase: December 2005, exchange rate: R$2.29/US$. 
database: January 2009, exchange rate: R$2.31/US$. 
competition. This result is consistent with the findings obtained by 
Guasch (2004). 
The procurement process used in Brazil, as in many other coun-
tries such as Spain, Chile, and Colombia, has been done largely on 
the basis of the so-called "open procedure." This is probably the 
most important reason why the number of bidders participating in 
the tendering processes for highway concessions in these countries 
is often quite large, which enhances competition and, consequently, 
low toll rates at the beginning of the contract. This procedure means 
that any company that fulfills the minimum requirements, as set out 
by the government in the contract's provisions, is allowed to par-
ticipate in the tendering process. Unlike other long-term infrastruc-
ture contracts in the world (e.g., the Design Build Finance Operate 
contracts in the United Kingdom, and most of the PPP contracts 
in Germany), concession contracts in Brazil were not agreed on 
in negotiations between the government and the bidders, but they 
are based on standard contracts that are slightly modified for each 
specific concession. As unforeseeable events may occur during the 
concession period that are not included in the original contract, 
these contracts can be characterized as incomplete contracts, as 
stated by Hart (2003). However, as a result of the simplicity of the 
process, transaction costs for both bidders and the government are 
very low as compared with other countries (Sánchez Soliño and 
Gago 2010). So, despite the contracts being incomplete, they seem 
to be attractive to both the private and the public sector. 
Toll Evolution 
As road concessions are long-term contracts, one of the key aspects 
for guaranteeing users' welfare is to set affordable tolls over the life 
of the contract. In most concessions, mechanisms are set up for 
yearly toll update. Concessions will perform better for the users 
insofar as tolls are updated according to the purchasing power of 
the society. High toll rises will not be good for users, and this may 
tend to prove that the risk allocation approach set up in the con-
tract was inadequate. The evolution of tolls will also enable the 
stakeholders to assess the quality of the contract and the regulatory 
system. For instance, excessive renegotiations can reduce the social 
gains achieved in the competitive tender. 
Toll rates are regulated in different ways across different coun-
tries. In some countries, such as Japan, tolls are regularly updated 
by the government to repay the debt issued by a state-owned agency 
in charge of collecting the tolls. In many countries, such as Spain, 
Chile, and Italy, tolls are updated according to the contract terms 
on the basis of indicators linked to the CPI with slight variations. 
In Spain, tolls are also updated based on productivity measured 
by comparing the actual traffic with the previously estimated traffic. 
In Chile, tolls are updated based on the fulfillment of certain safety 
indicators. In Brazil, toll setting includes provision for both an 
adjustment to inflation and a revision to compensate the conces-
sionaire for risks that the contract does not allocate to it. 
Both types of toll rate updates used in Brazil (revision and 
adjustment) directly affect the toll rate ultimately charged to the 
users. IPEA (2012) conducted a study comparing the evolution of 
tolls charged with the inflation from 1996 to 2011 to analyze the 
users' perception of toll rate increases. They found that toll rates 
from first stage concessions increased in real terms by 121%. This 
data provides evidence that concessionaires were likely favored by 
this approach, and also indicates that the adjustment and/or revision 
method could be not adequate. 
For this reason, to evaluate the methods used to regularly update 
toll rates over the years in Brazilian concessions, it is necessary to 
analyze the evolution of tolls, making a distinction between the two 
components: revision and adjustment. This analysis was conducted 
for the toll concessions awarded during the first stage only, because 
the concessions concluded in the two later stages are very recent 
and have not as yet generated enough available data to be useful. 
First, the annual toll rate growth caused by revision in year i was 
calculated [Eq. (2)]. Revisions are the mechanism for rebalancing 
the economics of the concession because of risks that were not 
allocated to the concessionaire's side: 
ARGR, 100 
/BR,- - BR,_A 
V BR,.! J (2) 
where ARGR; = annual toll rate growth caused by revision in year 
i (%); and BR,- = basic toll rate (not adjusted to reflect inflationary 
effects) concerning revision in year i (R$). 
If ARGR, turns out to be a positive number, it means that there 
was a revision that resulted in an increase in the basic toll rates. 
On the other hand, if ARGR, turns out to be negative, this means 
that the basic toll rate would be reduced after the revision. The data 
are available from 1996, when the first concession contracts were 
awarded, until 2011. 
Table 3. Toll Rate Growth due to Revision 
Concessionaire 
Nova Dutra (%) 
Ponte Rio-Niterói (%) 
CONCER (%) 
CRT (%) 
Concepa (%) 
Ecosul (%) 
Mean (%) 
Standard deviation (%) 
97 
10 
6 
15 
4 
— 
— 
9 
5 
98 
0 
0 
0 
u 
11 
— 
2 
5 
99 
- 4 
- 4 
- 5 
-11 
- 3 
— 
- 6 
3 
00 
4 
5 
7 
kfc 
9 
— 
8 
6 
01 
1 
JU 
& 
-1 
— 
• 2 
6 
02 
- 3 
U 
J 
- 1 1 
3 
8 
0 
7 
03 
2 
H 
-i 
2 
11 
8 
6 
4 
04 
0 
I 
- 1 
- 4 
- 1 
8 
0 
4 
05 
1 
- 1 
- 1 
1 
4 
8 
2 
3 
06 
0 
0 
- 4 
5 
1 
9 
2 
4 
07 
2 
2 
0 
2 
2 
8 
3 
3 
08 
- 1 
0 
- 1 
1 
- 1 
0 
0 
1 
09 
1 
2 
2 
17 
7 
0 
5 
6 
10 
1 
4 
- 2 
3 
3 
5 
2 
2 
11 
0 
3 
1 
12 
3 
3 
4 
4 
Accumulated 
14 
40 
26 
40 
45 
73 
39 
20 
Note: Elaborated by the authors with data taken from ANTT—Annual Reports. Data base: Federal road concessions from 1996 to 2011. 
The results are displayed in Table 3. On average, tolls increased 
by almost 40% in real terms from the beginning of the concession 
until 2011. The greatest increase, that of 73% by Ecosul, probably 
can be explained by the unusual history of this particular conces-
sion. It is a federal road granted by Rio Grande do Sul State that 
faced political problems in the early years. As a result, it was re-
turned to the control of the federal government, leading to revisions 
in the contract to adapt to the federal program. 
These values do not incorporate inflationary adjustments 
over the life of the concession contracts. One of the causes of 
revision in the first stage is precisely the fact that the part of the 
construction risk related to quantity was not allocated to the 
concessionaire. The values of ARGR¡ vary across different con-
cession projects, even though three of them are close to the 
average value. 
This fact demonstrates that there were many events that justified 
the rebalancing of the economics of the contract to compensate 
the concessionaire for risks or actions of the government that were 
not allocated to them, or possibly not even mentioned, in the origi-
nal contract. This can be a consequence of the incompleteness of 
contracts when the "open procedure" is used to tender concessions. 
The basic toll rate changed in 85% of the years analyzed. In addi-
tion, most of these changes reflected toll rate increases rather than 
reductions. This result is consistent with the research conducted by 
Guasch (2004) that found that 62% of the renegotiation processes 
ended up with increases in toll rates. 
Table 3 shows how from 2003 onwards the revisions appeared 
to be more moderate. The main reason for this is that in 2002 the 
National Agency for Land Transport was created to regulate and 
provide oversight for road concessions more effectively. The inde-
pendence of this regulatory agency likely contributed to reducing 
the need to revise toll rates as often, or in as great an amount, 
as previously. 
The other component of the toll rate modifications, over time, is 
the adjustment mechanism, which compensates for inflationary 
losses. For the concessions dating back to the first stage—the ones 
with a long track record as of 2012—the yearly adjustment was 
calculated on the basis of a basket of prices that included the labor 
costs and materials for the construction industry. This calculation 
resulted in inflationary adjustments that were much higher than the 
growth in average consumer prices. 
Table 4 compares the toll rate increase attributable to the ap-
proach of periodic adjustments with Brazil's most popular con-
sumer price index (IPCA) for the same period. The values in 
Table 4 do not include the effect of toll rate revision previously 
explained. This table shows how such yearly adjustments were 
far above the rise in consumer price indexes. The result was that 
the tolls charged by the concessions became progressively more 
onerous for users. It is precisely this that ultimately led the 
government to change the adjustment approach in the concession 
contracts granted after 2008 towards an adjustment index based 
only on the inflation rate (IPCA). 
Traffic Behavior 
Traffic is a key driver for the toll concession business. Comparing 
ex ante and ex post traffic permits the evaluation of whether the 
project is ultimately viable for the concessionaire. Thus, forecasting 
traffic correctiy turns out to be crucial in concession contracts 
where traffic risk is to be borne by the concessionaire, and the rev-
enue of the project comes only from toll revenues. 
As the winner of the bid is the one who offers the lowest toll 
rate, bidders are often tempted to overestimate the traffic, expecting 
that their losses will be offset by future renegotiations of the con-
tract (Guasch 2004). The literature shows that bidders tend to act 
strategically in competitive auctions to win the competition at all 
costs (Bain 2009; Baeza and Vassallo 2010). Baeza and Vassallo 
(2012) reported significant bias towards traffic overestimation, 
with 50% of the deviation during the ramp-up period in road con-
cession contracts in Spain linked to the availability of frequent 
renegotiations. 
This section explores how real traffic behaves in the concessions 
of the federal program of Brazil, using a specific record of traffic, to 
identify whether there has been overestimation of traffic by bidders. 
The only data that are available from 2002 to 2011 are analyzed. 
The traffic behavior analysis attempts to evaluate the adequacy 
of the road concession program by comparing the real level of 
traffic compared with the original forecasts. To evaluate the traffic 
forecast accuracy, there are two defined indicators. The first one is 
the annual traffic inaccuracy (ATI,), which evaluates the inaccuracy 
of traffic forecast, comparing the real traffic with forecast values for 
each year, using Eq. (3): 
Table 4. Difference between the Toll Rate Growth due to Inflationary 
Adjustments and Inflation (IPCA) 
Concessionaire 
Nova Dutra 
Ponte 
Rio-Niterói 
CONCER 
CRT 
Concepa 
Ecosul 
Beginning of 
toll charge 
August 1996 
August 1996 
August 1996 
September 1996 
October 1997 
March 2001 
Inflationary 
adjustments 
accumulated 
(%) 
228 
249 
210 
213 
249 
117 
Inflation 
growth 
(IPCA) 
(%) 
154 
154 
154 
153 
139 
100 
Difference 
(%) 
74 
95 
56 
60 
110 
17 
Note: Elaborated by the authors with data taken from ANTT—Annual 
Reports and EBGE (2012); database: Federal road concessions from 
1996 to 2011. 
Table 5. Annual Traffic Inaccuracy of Traffic Forecasts (ATI;) 
Concessionaire 
Nova Dutra (96) 
Ponte Rio-Niterói (%) 
CONCER (%) 
CRT (%) 
Concepa (%) 
Ecosul (%) 
Mean (%) 
Standard deviation f.'So 
2002 
- 4 
- 6 
- 2 2 
• - S 
- 3 2 
- 1 4 
- 1 4 
11 
2003 
- 8 
- 1 0 
- 2 7 
- 1 1 
- 3 4 
- 1 4 
- 1 7 
11 
2004 
- 4 
- 1 4 
- 2 8 
- 7 
- 3 3 
- 1 1 
- 1 6 
12 
2005 
- 8 
- 1 5 
- 2 8 
- 1 1 
36 
- 2 1 
- 2 0 
11 
2006 
- 1 0 
- 1 7 
- 2 9 
- 1 1 
- 3 6 
- 1 9 
- 2 0 
10 
2007 
- 9 
- 2 4 
- 2 3 
- 1 2 
- 3 4 
- 8 
- 1 8 
10 
2008 
- 2 
- 1 5 
- 2 1 
- 2 
- 3 1 
- 5 
- 1 3 
12 
2009 
- 5 
- 1 5 
- 1 5 
16 
- 3 2 
- 6 
-T5 
10 
2010 
- 2 
- 1 5 
- 1 4 
11 
- 3 2 
2 
-K 
15 
2011 
4 
- 1 3 
0 
1 
- 2 9 
12 
-I 
15 
Mean 
- 5 
- 1 4 
- 2 1 
- 7 
- 3 3 
- 8 
— 
— 
Standard 
deviation 
4 
5 
9 
8 
2 
10 
— 
— 
Note: Elaborated by the authors with data taken from ANTT—Annual Reports; database: Equivalent traffic of federal road concessions from 
2002 to 2011. 
ATI, = 100 
. ETf - ETf 
ÜT? (3) 
where ATI,- = annual traffic inaccuracy in year i (%); ETf = 
equivalent traffic (real) in year i (vehicles); and ETf = equivalent 
traffic (forecasted) in year ¡' (vehicles). 
For analyzing traffic evolution the "total equivalent traffic" of 
the year was used, which is obtained by multiplying the number 
of vehicles using the concession road being analyzed by their 
respective toll rate multipliers. This is equal to the number of 
vehicles' axles. This variable is used because it is directly related 
to the concessionaire's income, once the traffic is multiplied by 
the toll rate multiplier for each vehicle. Real values are the ones 
actually observed, whereas forecasted values are the ones presented 
by the winning bidder in his offer. 
If ATI,- is negative, this means that real traffic was ultimately 
lower than expected, so traffic was overestimated. If ATI,- is pos-
itive, this means that traffic was underestimated. 
Table 5 shows the values of ATT,- for road concessions in Brazil. 
For the period under analysis, all concessionaires overestimated 
traffic in almost every year. In some cases, the forecasts exceeded 
the real traffic by 30%. Only Nova Dutra presents a misestimate 
that fell within 5% of the real figure for all years. This concession 
is for the road link between Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the 
two largest cities in Brazil, so it already had a consolidated traf-
fic flow when the concession was started. The rest of the conces-
sions examined exhibit inaccuracies in a range between —7% and 
—33% compared with the original proposal. The better results of 
the most recent years may be a consequence of Brazilian economic 
growth, which was reflected in a substantial traffic flow increase 
that would likely be closer to, or not as different from, the original 
estimates of traffic on which successful bidders for concessions 
initially relied. 
The second indicator used in this analysis measures the annual 
traffic growth (TG(). This indicator gives the forecast and the real 
traffic growth for each year using Eq. (4): 
TG, = 100 ( E T , - E T | . i ) 
ET,-_, (4) 
where TG, = traffic growth in year i (%); and ET( = equivalent 
traffic (either forecasted or real) in year i (vehicles). 
Table 6 shows the values of traffic growth TG¡ for the six con-
cessions of the first stage. Almost half of the data analyzed show a 
difference on forecast and real growth above 5%. Table 6 shows the 
Table 6. Forecast and Real Traffic Growth (TG;) and Brazilian GDP Growth 
Concessionaire 
Nova Dutra 
Forecast (%) 
Real (%) 
Ponte Rio-Niterói 
Forecast (%) 
Real (%) 
CONCER 
Forecast (%) 
Real (%) 
CRT 
Forecast (%) 
Real (%) 
Concepa 
Forecast (%) 
Real(%) 
Ecosul 
Forecast (%) 
Real (%) 
Brazilian GDP (%) 
2003 
3 
- 1 
3 
- 1 
4 
- 3 
4 
2 
4 
0 
7 
7 
1.1 
2004 
3 
9 
6 
1 
4 
3 
4 
8 
4 
6 
2 
6 
5.7 
2005 
33 
39 
- 1 
0 
- 3 
- 3 
- 4 
0 
- 4 
1 
- 4 
8 
3.2 
2006 
48 
45 
2 
- 1 
1 
- 1 
2 
2 
4 
5 
1 
4 
4 
2007 
4 
4 
11 
3 
2 
11 
5 
2 
3 
7 
2 
17 
6.1 
2008 
- 2 
5 
- 7 
4 
2 
5 
0 
12 
4 
9 
0 
3 
5.1 
2009 
3 
- 1 
2 
1 
2 
9 
11 
- 5 
3 
I 
2 
2 
-0 .3 
2010 
20 
24 
1 
2 
1 
3 
- 2 4 
0 
11 
12 
3 
11 
7.5 
2011 
3 
9 
1 
3 
1 
17 
16 
6 
4 
8 
2 
12 
2.7 
Note: Elaborated by the authors with data taken from ANTT—Annual Reports and IBGE (2012); database: Equivalent traffic of federal road concessions from 
2002 to 2011. 
evolution of the real GDP growth as well, to analyze the impact of 
economic growth on traffic growth inaccuracy. 
Table 6 reveals that years with high GDP growths coincide 
with high real traffic growth, whereas years with low or even 
negative growth in GDP coincide with low real traffic growth rates. 
Moreover, the growth in traffic seems to be higher than GDP 
growth; the elasticity of road demand (traffic) as compared with 
economic growth seems to be higher than 1. This result confirms 
the importance of economic growth on the increase in traffic de-
mand, particularly when toll roads do not have a clear alternative 
competing with them. 
The comparison of these results with previous studies conducted 
in Spain (Baeza and Vassallo 2012) and with a worldwide database 
(Bain 2009) indicated similarities in traffic level overestimation, 
mainly in the early years of operation. In addition, estimates accu-
racy in Brazil also improved over time—reducing ATT; value—but 
deviation increased. However, Brazil presents lower values of 
inaccuracy, probably because concessions are brownfield projects 
and there are no competitive free roads. 
Conclusions 
In this paper the performance oí the federal toll road concession 
program that has been implemented in Brazil was assessed by 
evaluating the outcome of the auctions, the toll update system, and 
the evolution of real traffic compared with the forecasts. 
Overall, it was found that the federal toll road program imple-
mented in Brazil was effective in two ways: first, in terms of the 
large number of kilometers of roads that were rehabilitated and up-
graded; second, in the benefits that accrued to the users of the roads 
from the noticeable improvement of the maintenance and operation 
of the roads. In addition, the initial public opposition against tolls 
decreased over the years as users became aware of the many ad-
vantages of having good roads. 
Moreover, the government has been making an effort to improve 
the program over the years through the construction of a better in-
stitutional framework, the offering of more sophisticated contracts, 
the use of a better risk allocation approach, and the implementation 
of a new tender procedure to achieve faster and more competi-
tive auctions. Private sponsors in turn have proven able to comply 
with their obligations to the lenders. In spite of this progress, the 
authors consider that there is still a long way to go to improve the 
quality of contracts, and the analysis conducted indicates some 
key challenges for the system of road concessions in Brazil in 
the future. 
Regarding the tender process, there is a lot of concern about the 
low toll rates obtained in the recent auctions, despite its apparent 
advantage for users. In this respect, it was found that because of 
the tender process—basically an auction that awards the concession 
to the bidder who offers to do the work asked and is willing to rely 
on the lowest toll—concessionaires tend to submit aggressive offers 
characterized by low tolls, which are often supported by overesti-
mates in their traffic forecasts. This would be good for users if 
tolls remained stable over the years. However, this has not been 
the case, because toll revisions in the end lead to higher toll levels. 
Huge toll rate increases, of course, are not desirable because they 
can eliminate the gains of a competitive bid and the road-using 
public suffers. 
Another peculiar aspect of road concessions in Brazil is that 
most of the debt comes from a public bank, the BNDES, which 
provides subsidized loans to concessions. This institution contrib-
uted a lot to reducing the financial cost of concessions projects in 
Brazil when interest rates were extremely high. However, the fact 
that this is a state-owned bank means that, in the final analysis, the 
government is indirectly bearing part of the risks of the concession 
contracts. This approach is thus worrisome for the government be-
cause if a severe recession eventually arrives, the BNDES will be 
bearing an important risk. 
To avoid these problems, it would be advisable that the 
government of Brazil attempt to make the future concessions more 
attractive for private investors, particularly such long-term institu-
tional investors as pension funds or insurance companies. To do so, 
the government should make an effort to draw up much more de-
tailed contracts to reduce continuous revisions, which ultimately 
result in toll rate increases. In addition, the government should im-
prove the risk allocation approach that mitigates some risks, such as 
traffic risk, which are barely manageable by the private sector, 
using, for example, flexible-term contracts. 
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